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WATER AND SANITATION FOR ALL: PARTNERSHIPS AND INNOVATIONS
IN 1994 THE civil war between Hutus and Tutsis in
Rwanda caused 700 thousand Hutu refugees to flee to
Goma in E Zaire and a similar number to NW Tanzania.
They had been living in refugee camps until November
1996 when fighting between rival groups in Eastern Zaire
caused them to return to Rwanda. Although a repatriation
had been anticipated by humanitarian organisations work-
ing in the area, nobody expected the scale of the sudden
mass movement of people which commenced on 16th
November. Preparations had been put in place, but a
repatriation on this scale had never been seen before,
resulting in Non Governmental Humanitarian Organisa-
tions (NGOs) being unprepared for the number of people
involved. Close co-operation was therefore required be-
tween these NGOs and the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to provide water and sani-
tation supplies to facilitate the return home of this transient
population.
This paper discusses the strategy that these agencies
adopted following the start of the refugees’ walk to their
homes in Rwanda. It also explains the problems that were
encountered and the lessons learnt, which assisted the
planning and implementation of a similar operation to
supply water to the refugees who returned from the camps
in Tanzania a month later.
The UNHCR definition of a refugee is “a person who is
outside his country of origin and who, due to a well found
fear of persecution is unable or unwilling to avail himself
of that country’s protection” (UNHCR 1982). Through-
out this paper the term refugee has been used to describe
a person who has left a foreign country to return to their
original country of residence.
Strategy
The provision of water to the refugees was co-ordinated by
the UNHCR with their implementing partners; Oxfam,
Medicins sans Frontieres (MSF), Trocaire and Italian Co-
operation (COOPI). Trocaire had been preparing a transit
centre at the Zaire/Rwanda border near Gisenyi over the
preceding weeks and COOPI had undertaken a similar
task at Nkamira. These organisations remained responsi-
ble for water supply at each of these centres while MSF and
Oxfam prepared water supply points on the road between
Gisenyi and Kigali via Ruhengari. The general strategy
was to provide water points along the roadside at 5 - 8 km
intervals, which consisted of a storage tank of between 10
and 30 m3 capacity and a tapstand(s) with 6 or 12 taps. The
interval was reduced in particularly arduous areas such as
steep terrain and increased in easy walking areas. Where
possible  water points were connected and supplied by
existing water systems such as gravity fed water from
captured springs. In other areas water points were sup-
plied by water tankers provided by the implementing
partners and filled from emergency and permanent water
treatment works along the route.
There were discussions within the group on the quantity
of water which the implementing partners should provide
following requests from UNHCR to provide a minimum of
15 litres per person per day (UNHCR 1982). It was agreed
that, as the refugees were moving, a target of between 5 and
10 litres would be more appropriate (UNHCR 1992).
Although these targets were set it was impossible to
measure if they were achieved; a more acceptable measure
of success would have been to ensure that each water point
permanently had a store of water.
Figure 1. Africa Figure 2. Rwanda
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Following the start of the repatriation it rapidly became
apparent that the Rwandan authorities would not allow
large numbers of people to congregate in one area, result-
ing in the frequent forcible emptying of the transit centres
(resting areas). These centres had large water storage
capacities (70 - 100 m3) which were connected to a piped
supply initially became redundant and a wasted resource.
More use was made of this resource when pipes were laid
to service new tapstands outside the transit centres along
the roadside. The refugees were also prevented from
leaving the main road unless they had reached their home
commune. This made existing water points or taps more
than 50 metres from the road, highlighted in the initial
assessments, redundant.  More water points supplied by
water trucks were therefore required.
Where water points were not connected to an existing
system they were supplied by a fleet of water tankers with
combined capacity of 90m3. This low capacity was accept-
able due to the number of water points connected to
existing systems. The tankers consisted of a mixture of
cleaned petrol tankers and flat bed trucks with bladder
tanks mounted on the back. Large pumps with a capacity
of 30 litres/s were set up at water treatment plants for rapid
loading while truck mounted pumps of 7 litre/s capacity
were used to discharge at the water points. As the authori-
ties were keen to move the refugees to their home com-
munes as quickly as possible they commandeered any
vehicle larger than a Land Rover to move people.  This
often resulted in the flat bed trucks being commandeered
to transport people, further reducing the trucking capacity.
As the refugees were permanently moving the water
demand constantly varied at each water point. This re-
sulted in some tankers being used as mobile water points.
While existing opinion is that water tankers should only be
used to transport water from a supply to a storage tank
(Davis J and Lambert B 1995 and others) this assumes that
the location of the demand is static and in general the
transport is from one supply to a central piped distribution
network. Two tankers were fitted with a tap bar on the
back of the truck with 6 or 8 taps. Drivers were instructed
to deliver water to the water points but if they were
prevented by the number of people on the road they should
stop and open the valve on the tap bar to supply water
directly from the tanker until they were able to proceed
down the road.
Water and sanitation review
After the  majority of refugees had returned from Goma the
watsan (water and sanitation) implementing partners and
UNHCR held a review to discuss successful actions and
lessons learnt.
Due to the lack of a secondary road network in NW
Rwanda the water trucks were forced to travel along the
main road being used by the refugees. During the main
influx the road became too congested with people to be
used by vehicles, preventing the trucks from travelling
between approximately 8am and 4 pm (it took 2 hours for
a truck to travel 2km near Nkamira during the main
influx).  This resulted in water points with lower capacities
running dry by mid-afternoon. Areas which are likely to be
difficult to reach if an alternative route is not available
should be provided with larger water storage capacities
and filled early in the morning or late in the afternoon.
It was agreed that one person should control all water
tankers to achieve effective co-ordination due to the number
of collection and delivery points. It is essential that this
person and all the truck drivers have a VHF radio and
desirable that radio communication with treatment plants
and major water points is also available. This person
should pay careful consideration to the deployment routes
of flat bed water trucks if they are likely to be requisitioned.
Once the refugees started returning from Goma there
was little time available to prepare water points for deploy-
ment. Oxfam and MSF utilised equipment packed in kit
form (MSF 1992, Luff 1997). However, for both organisa-
tions a water point consisted of at least a couple of kits, plus
some additional pipes and fittings. Towards the end of the
initial influx both organisations were often searching in
their stores for additional fittings that were required to
complete a water point.  In order to improve the deploy-
ment of water points NGO field stores should be prepared
with ‘bundles’ of water points, consisting of all kits and
items necessary to provide a 10 m3 or 30 m3 water point.
This preparation would allow field staff to rapidly collect
Figure 1. Water points for the Goma repatriation
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and deploy a water point from the store. It was pointed out
that, if rapid deployment was necessary, a number of these
water point ‘bundles’ could be distributed on a truck, with
a guard for each point. A vehicle of technicians could then
follow behind to set-up and install the equipment.
Due to the rate of influx it was felt during the review that
the large Oxfam metal tanks (Luff 1997) were unsuitable
for use at water points, unless prepositioned in advance,
due to the set up time required. Bladder tanks and Oxfam
‘onion’ tanks with a capacity of between 10m3 and 30m3
proved to be the most practical. Any tanks with a capacity
of less than 10m3 were unsuitable for water points which
required trucking due the frequency of visits required.
However, down to 5m3 they were useful at water points fed
by gravity from capped springs as, at times, the demand
was greater than the supply flow.
When the refugees fled Zaire they had very few posses-
sions due to looting by retreating soldiers and the speed
with which they left. Apart from the plastic sheeting from
their camps each family generally had one or two 20 litre
jerry cans which had been provided by NGOs in the camps
during the previous 2 years. These jerry cans were carried by
people of all ages from 5 years old upwards. While these size
jerry cans may be ideal in refugee camps, were water only has
to be carried a few hundred metres, they proved unsuitable,
especially for children, on the long walk. Due to the spacing
of the water points it would have been sufficient to carry
approximately 5 litres of water for two people. Small jerry
cans of 5 litre capacity were therefore urgently needed to
be provided to the refugees returning from Goma.
During the Goma repatriation the refugees had no
indication of the distances between water points, which
resulted in many of them carrying an unnecessary large
quantity of water and only filling their jerry cans at every
second water point. It was therefore agreed that signs
should be  prepared in Swahili and Kinyarwanda (or the
local language) and positioned at each water point indicat-
ing the distance to the next.
Tanzanian repatriation
Following the watsan review of the Goma repatriation,
‘bundles’ of water points were prepared before the major
influx of refugees from Tanzania. As the repatriation did
not occur at the rate witnessed in NW Rwanda, rapid
deployment of water points was not necessary. However,
the preparation of water points in the stores highlighted
item shortages before they were required to be deployed
As a secondary road network existed in SE Rwanda the
water trucks were able to bypass ‘human bottlenecks’ on
the main roads and continue delivering water. In areas
where a suitable secondary route did not exist larger water
storage capacities of 30 m3 were provided and only sup-
plied by large tankers (25 m3) in the morning and after-
noon.
The idea of mobile water points was refined in the
Tanzanian repatriation with some water tankers carrying
tapstands and connecting pipework. The refugee transpor-
tation pick-up and set-down points, where there was the
highest demand for water, changed by the hour over a
period of about a week. The water tankers equipped with
tapstands were able to move to these new locations and
immediately supply water. They supplied their tapstands
by gravity, the tank being high enough on the chassis to
deliver all the water at sufficient head.
The availability of radios at all the water treatment
plants and in the majority of the water tankers resulted in
a faster tanker turn around, a more efficient deployment of
mobile water points and fewer static water points running
out of water.
During the Tanzanian repatriation and return of refu-
gees from the forests surrounding Bukarvu, south of Goma
collapsible 10 litre jerry cans were handed out to refugees
passing along the road at some feeding stations along with
high energy biscuits. Although the collapsible containers
were generally handed out empty, some were filled and
oral rehydration salts (ORS) added. These containers were
handed out to people who were identified as suffering from
dehydration. The fact that the cans were supplied col-
lapsed allowed one pick-up working in the Bukarvu area
to leave the field base and fill up limited numbers of cans
with water and ORS, as required, to be handed out to
people as they joined the road from the forests without
having to return to base during the day. In areas where
there was a high incidence of dehydration local Red Cross
staff were employed at each water point to prepare barrels
of ORS and hand out measured quantities to people as they
passed.
Signs were prepared in Swahili and Kinyarwanda, along
with simple drawings, and positioned at each water point
indicating the distance to the next. These signs proved very
Figure 5. An Oxfam tapstand
Figure 4. A flexible onion tank
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effective in reducing the quantity of water that the refugees
carried. Similar signs were also successful in dissuading
people from taking water from untreated/polluted sources
when they were aware that a water point was a short
distance down the road.
Lessons Learnt
Additional implementing agencies assisting in the Tanza-
nian repatriation, where there was a longer lead time to
procure suitable water trucks, had neglected to address the
issues of loading and discharging water. This resulted in
some trucks being inefficient or causing delays at the water
treatment works as they had no truck mounted pump. In
the worst case one truck with a low mounted tank was
unable to deliver water into the majority of water storage
tanks. In future operations all water trucks should carry a
small pump capable of loading and discharging water from
its tank.
The collapsible jerry cans distributed during the  had a
number of advantages over the ‘traditional’ 20 litre jerry
cans:
• They were not as bulky as the 20 litre containers which
made them easier to carry by young children
• If they were only half filled their volume was only 5
litres which also made carrying easier
• As they were supplied collapsed a large number could
be transported on each delivery trip. (e.g. A Land
Cruiser pick-up could carry 1000 containers in two
packing crates rather than 80-100 rigid 20 litre cans.)
The disadvantage of these collapsible jerry cans is that
they are not as durable as a rigid container, probably only
lasting a few weeks or months rather than a year or two.
However, for the walking phase of the repatriation the
distribution of small containers to as many people as
possible was the primary objective. The working life of the
container after the repatriation was not important.
As these water containers were viewed as a vital com-
modity, even when empty, scuffles and even fights could
break out where they were handed out. The most effective
distribution points with the least disturbances were near
the top of a long rise, when the refugees were more spread
out and walking slowly. If people arrived faster than the
cans could be distributed it was easier to arrange for a
queuing system to be formed in these locations than in
flatter areas.
Although these signs reduced the amount of water
carried and evened the refugees’ demand along the road,
they highlighted the areas where a large proportion of
water was being taken by the local population. In these
instances the emergency water point was located nearer to
their home than their usual supply. It was clearly politically
unacceptable to prevent the local population from taking
water resulting in a higher than expected demand being
supplied.
In emergency situations it is generally agreed that the
level of residual chlorine in potable water should be
between 0.2 or 0.3 and 0.5 mg/l (MSF 1994, Davis and
Lambert 1995, UNHCR 1992). Due to the number of
water transfers and receptacles which were involved dur-
ing the trucking of water and the cleanliness of the refugees
water containers, it was discovered that a residual chlorine
concentration of between 1.0 and 1.2 mg/l was necessary
for water leaving the treatment plants. This resulted in a
residual chlorine concentration of 0.2 - 0.5 mg/l in refu-
gees’ jerry cans.
During both major repatriations, especially the Tanza-
nian, there was a high level of inter-agency co-operation.
This co-operation highlighted the different equipment
specification which agencies work to, especially in terms of
pipe types, diameters and fittings. If it is anticipated that
other interagency operations of this kind are likely to be
required in the future it would be highly desirable if the
major public health NGOs met to agree a common stand-
ard for water pipe fittings. If it is not logistically possible
to achieve a common specification then adaptation fittings
should be procured by implementing agencies in greater
numbers than are currently available.
Conclusion
It is impossible to determine if the water supply targets
were met due to:
• the use of the water points by the local populations;
• the supply of some water points from existing systems;
• widely varying estimates of the number of refugees
travelling down the roads.
However, medical reports indicated that the instances of
dehydration reduced following the installation of all the
water points in NW Rwanda, and the incidents of dehydra-
tion were also significantly lower during the Tanzanian
repatriation.
 The scale of water supplies required on both repatriations
was too large to be managed by one NGO. The success of
each operation was only achieved through the close co-
operation between all agencies to achieve the common
humanitarian goal of the relief of suffering.
References
DAVIS, J., and LAMBERT, R., 1995, Engineering for
Emergencies, IT Publications, London.
LUFF, R., 1997, OXFAM Emergency Water Supply and
Other Related Equipment  Oxfam (Restricted availabil-
ity).
MEDICINS SANS FRONTIERES, 1994, Public Health
Engineering in Emergency Situation, MSF, Paris.
MSF, 1992. Non Medical Kits and Modules, MSF Hol-
land, Amsterdam.
UNHCR, 1982, Handbook for Emergencies: Field Opera-
tions, UNHCR, Geneva.
UNHCR, 1992, Water Manual for Refugees Situations,
UNHCR, Geneva.
PAUL LARCHER, Research Associate, Institute of
Development Engineering.
